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Every day people make countless decisions, for example about when and what to eat, to go to work by car or by bike, or to watch that movie or go to bed early. For all of these decisions, an individual has to choose between several options that all have their own reward-value and their own risk. Processing reward-value and risk are therefore important factors in decision-making.

In this thesis I will first discuss the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH), which is a theory on decision-making that is based on processing emotional reactions to the different choice options (Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1996). Then I will discuss several lines of criticism on the SMH. I will then focus on other studies on decision making, to give an overview of what happens from the moment an individual encounters choices to the moment after a decision has been made. The studies I will discuss here use different tasks, but share some similarities which I will mention when I describe the methods of each task. Several factors have been found to influence reward value and risk-taking behaviour, and therefore also decision-making. I will discuss some of these factors: First I will explain how future discounting influences reward-value and how previous experiences can influence risk-taking behaviour. Then I will briefly discuss how other people can influence our decisions. To conclude I will mention some directions for future research.

This review does not aim at being exhaustive. Only a small amount of the large body of literature on human decision-making will be discussed. In order to clarify some of the tasks that were used, original Figures were reproduced, with their original captions in italics.


The somatic marker hypothesis

One theory on decision-making is the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH). According to this hypothesis, emotions express themselves through changes in representations of the bodily state, primarily via transient changes in activity in the somatosensory cortices and the insula (Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1996). When making decisions, ‘somatic markers’ arise in the brain’s representation of the body. A somatic marker can be seen as an indication of changes in our bodily state, and thus emotional reaction, to a response option. The somatic markers influence the response to stimuli at both a conscious and an unconscious level. According to the SMH, the somatic markers can limit the number of options by rapidly rejecting the options that evoke negative emotions, i.e., bring forward punishment. Only the options that evoke positive emotions remain a possibility to be chosen (Damasio, 1996). Besides the valence of emotions, the strength of the somatic state also influences whether or not an option will be eliminated. The stronger the somatic state, the more likely it is that the somatic state will be reinforced (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). In other words; both the valance of emotions evoked by an option and the strength of these emotions determine which option or options remain a possibility to be chosen, providing for cost-benefit analyses, if necessary. Without somatic markers, decisions have to be based solely on logic, which is a much slower process (Damasio, 1996).
There are two ways somatic markers can arise: When an individual encounters a situation in the immediate environment, this is a so-called primary inducer, and when he thinks about such an event, i.e., a secondary inducer. The amygdala is critical in triggering somatic states from primary inducers via projections to the brain stem (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). When an individual for example encounters a snake, his heart rate goes up. The central nucleus of the amygdala receives direct input from the sensory systems, i.e., somatosensory cortices and insula, and is involved in emotional learning. It creates an association between sensory inputs, i.e., somatic states, and their reward value (Murray, 2007). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) forms the emotional memory: It couples the knowledge of the encountered situation, i.e., facts about the situation, to the somatic states that were induced by the situation (Bechara, 2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1996). Only after this emotional learning occurred, secondary inducers can induce somatic states by activating knowledge in the vmPFC.
Thinking about a situation, i.e., the secondary inducer, can give rise to somatic markers via two loops: The body loop and the as-if loop, both displayed in Figure 1. In both loops thinking about a situation activates knowledge in the vmPFC and via the vmPFC the amygdala is also activated. In the body loop, which can be seen on the left of Figure 1, actual re-enactment of the somatic state in the body is induced via the amygdala. The somatosensory cortices and insula are then activated, as is the case with primary inducers. In the as-if loop, showed on the right sight of Figure 1, the body is by-passed and the somatosensory cortices and insula are directly activated by the vmPFC and amygdala (Bechara, 2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1996).


Figure 1 – Schematic overview of the body loop and the “as if” loop. Reproduced from Bechara (2004) without permission. In both ‘‘body loop’’ and ‘‘as if loop’’ panels, the brain is represented by the top black perimeter and the body by the bottom one. Amyg = amygdala VM = ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 

Damage to the vmPFC impairs the possibility to re-experience emotions (Bechara, 2004), and thus somatic markers will not be activated. It has been shown that people that suffer from damage to the bilateral vmPFC have difficulties making decisions. The option they choose is often not the best option or even has a negative effect and it is different from what they would have chosen before the damage occurred (see e.g. Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Anderson, 1998; or Damasio, 1996, for a short review).
Most evidence in favour of the SMH comes from the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson, 1994), a diagram of which is shown in Figure 2. In the IGT participants can pick cards from four decks, two of which are beneficial in the long run, i.e., the “good” or advantageous decks, and two of which will lead to loss, i.e., the “bad” of disadvantageous decks. Participants receive money for each card they select, and for some cards they have to pay an unexpected penalty. In Figure 2, deck A and B are the disadvantageous decks, each card provides a $100 gain, but the penalties add up to $1250 per ten cards, leading to an overall loss of $250 per ten cards. Deck C and D are the advantageous decks. Gain for these cards is only $50 per card, but the loss over ten cards is only $250, leading to an overall gain of $250 per ten cards (Bechara, et al., 1994).


Figure 2 – A schematic diagram of the Iowa Gambling Task Reproduced from Bechara, et al. (2005) without permission. The participants are given four decks of cards, a loan of $2000 facsimile US bills, and asked to play so as to win the most money. Turning each card carries an immediate reward ($100 in decks A and B and $50 in decks C and D). Unpredictably, however, the turning of some cards also carries a penalty (which is large in decks A and B and small in decks C and D). Playing mostly from decks A and B leads to an overall loss. Playing from decks C and D leads to an overall gain. The players cannot predict when a penalty will occur, nor calculate with precision the net gain or loss from each deck. They also do not know how many cards must be turned before the end of the game (the game in fact ends after 100 card selections). 

Participants are asked to select one card at a time, until they are told to stop. For each trial, i.e., every time a card is selected, participants either gain or lose some money. The goal of the task is to win as much money as possible (Bechara, et al., 1994).
It has been shown that patients that suffer from damage to the vmPFC perform worse than healthy people. In the IGT it is unlikely that participants can calculate net gain and losses. Instead they have to rely on somatic markers in a more intuitive way of decision making (Bechara, et al., 1994). To test this, ten healthy persons and six patients with damage to the vmPFC participated in a study in which they were asked what they knew and how they felt about the IGT every ten cards, starting at the twentieth card. Prior to picking a card, skin conductance responses (SCR) were measured (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio, 1997). An SCR is the physiological phenomenon that the skin becomes more conducting, i.e., it conducts more electricity, when a person is aroused. In the present study, it indicates the occurrence of a somatic state and thus an emotional response (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Lee, 1999). The healthy participants showed greater anticipatory SCRs, i.e., an SCR in anticipation of the outcome, when picking a card from a disadvantageous deck compared to an advantageous deck when they still indicated they did not know what was going on. Seven of the ten healthy participants indicated they knew what was going on after eighty cards had been picked, and all healthy participants still showed anticipatory SCRs at this point. Three of the six patients knew which decks were advantageous, but they still picked disadvantageous cards. None of the patients showed anticipatory SCRs, indicating no somatic states occurred (Bechara, et al., 1997). These results suggest that the vmPFC indeed plays a role in re-enacting of somatic states, which guides behaviour. Also, knowing what is going on, what decks an individual should pick, is not enough to actually play the IGT advantageously.
Not only patients with damage to the vmPFC show impaired performance on the IGT, patients with damage to the amygdala also pick more cards from the disadvantageous decks. In addition, as is the case for vmPFC patients, patients with damage to the amygdala do not show anticipatory SCRs. When looking at SCRs in response to direct reward and punishment it was found that damage to the vmPFC did not influence the occurrence and magnitude of the SCRs, i.e., they show SCRs that are similar to controls, whereas patients that suffer from damage to the amygdala show no SCRs (Bechera, et al., 1999). This indicates that the amygdala is necessary in responding to emotional stimuli, like reward and punishment, whereas the vmPFC is not. In a fear-condition task amygdala patients also did not show conditioned SCRs in response to an image previously associated with a loud sound, but vmPFC damage did not impair the evolvement of conditioned SCRs in this task (Bechara, et al., 1999). As stated earlier, SCRs are an indication of a somatic state (Bechara, et al., 1999) in response to either a primary or a secondary inducer. The amygdala is necessary for the occurrence of a somatic state in response to both primary and secondary inducers (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). When the amygdala is damaged, there is no response and thus no SCRs are seen. The vmPFC is only necessary for the evolvement of SCRs in response to secondary inducers and not to primary inducers. As has been previously studied, the vmPFC is not necessary in fear-conditioning (Morgan and LeDoux, 1995), which explains why damage to the vmPFC does not impair the occurrence of SRCs in the conditioning task. When deciding what card to pick, previous experiences with picking a card from a certain deck work as a secondary inducer for somatic states. This is why vmPFC patients do not show anticipatory SCRs.

Criticism on the somatic marker hypothesis

Besides the evidence in favour of the SMH, there are studies that question this hypothesis. The main lines of criticism focus on how much knowledge participants have and describe the IGT as a reversal task.
As discussed before, Bechara and colleagues (1997) showed that somatic markers can unconsciously guide decision-making by asking participants about their knowledge of the IGT and measuring SCRs, but this conclusion has been doubted. In a study that did not measure SCRs, a second condition was added to the experiment with open questions as conducted by Bechara and colleagues (1997). In this second condition more specific questions about each of the four decks were asked. A total of forty people participated in this study, twenty in each condition, and both groups performed equally well, i.e., there was no difference in how many cards were picked from the two advantageous decks and from the two disadvantageous decks (Maia and McClelland, 2004). Thus, the more specific questionnaire did not influence performance when compared to the condition in which open questions were asked. Just as in the study by Bechara and colleagues (1997), participants in the open-question condition showed an advantageous strategy even though they did not report that they knew what was going on. Participants that were asked more specific questions showed more knowledge about the advantageous strategy. Only when they had this knowledge these participants behaved advantageously. According to the authors, these results indicate that participants do have some conscious knowledge about the IGT before they start behaving advantageously. This implies that somatic markers may not arise unconsciously, but arise after some knowledge is gained (Maia and McClelland, 2004). However, it cannot be ruled out that the conscious knowledge arose only because it was needed in this situation to answer the questions. Participants in the open-question condition still behaved advantageously before being able to tell what was going on. As no SCRs were measured, it cannot be said when somatic markers started arising. Another plausible explanation for the results found by Maia and McClelland (2004) is that somatic markers arise after participants get a bit experienced in the task. By performing the IGT, a person gains knowledge about the task, which stays unconscious and in turn influences the somatic markers. A process in which the vmPFC plays a role, which explains why vmPFC patients do not show anticipatory SCRs, even though they do know which decks are advantageous (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio, 2005).
	Other criticism focuses on the performance of patients with damage to the vmPFC. In the original IGT, one of the disadvantageous decks starts as a very advantageous deck with nine wins, before one loss occurs. Participants that start picking from this deck have to change their strategy to play the IGT advantageously, i.e., they need to start picking from the advantageous decks and stop picking cards form the disadvantageous deck that seemed very advantageous. This gives the IGT aspects of a reversal task (Bechara, et al., 2005; Maia and McClelland, 2004). In a shuffled version of the IGT the order of the cards was changed. All decks started with card 9 of the original IGT, the order the cards was only changed for deck B. In this deck card 1 and 4 were switched. It was found that nine vmPFC patients performed equally well as the control group. In the simple reversal learning task that was also administered two decks were used. Deck A was associated with a $50 win and deck B with a 50$ loss. When participants had learned this, the associations of the decks switched, so that deck A was now associated with loss and deck B with the $50 win. Participants had to learn these new, reversed, associations. Patients that suffer from damage to the vmPFC showed difficulties changing strategy in this task. A negative correlation between reversal task performance and benefit from the shuffled IGT was found, i.e., the worse the score on the reversal task, the more someone benefitted from the shuffling (Fellows and Farah, 2005). However, the most important problem for vmPFC patients seems to be the absence of somatic markers. Even when vmPFC patients indicate they know what is happening in the IGT, they still perform disadvantageously (Bechera, et al., 1997). This can be explained by the absence of somatic markers, as indicated by a lacking of SCRs, but not by a lack of knowledge (Bechara, et al., 1997, 2005). The absence of somatic markers can also explain why vmPFC patients have difficulties with reversal tasks: There is no internal signal to support this reversal (Bechara, et al., 2005). In short: vmPFC patients do not have difficulties with the IGT, because it might have characteristics of a reversal task, but because damage to the vmPFC prevents the occurrence of somatic markers in response to secondary inducers.


Other studies of decision-making

Several distinctions can be made when discussing decision-making. The options need to be evaluated, a process in which reward processing plays a role. To actually choose one of the options the risk associated with this option may require some thought. After a decision is made, there is anticipation and evaluation of the outcome. Different brain areas have been shown to play a role in these different stages of decision-making. In 2011, Liu, Hairston, Schrier, and Fan conducted a meta-analysis of 142 imaging studies looking at reward-related tasks. All studies included in this meta-analysis used healthy adults as participants, reported their findings in a standard coordinate space and did not only use region-of interest analysis, i.e., did not only look at specific brain areas. It was found that rewards activate the nucleus accumbens, ventral striatum, anterior insula (AI), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), right amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Punishment was found to activate the nucleus accumbens, AI, medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), ACC and mPFC. Activity in the nucleus accumbens, ventral striatum, AI and OFC was greater for rewards than for punishment. When comparing reward and punishment, the nucleus accumbens and mOFC showed higher activity for rewards, whereas the ACC and mPFC responded more to punishment. Reward anticipation was found to activate the ventral striatum, AI, ACC and mPFC more than did reward outcome, whereas reward outcome led to greater activity in the nucleus accumbens, caudate nucleus and OFC, when compared to anticipation of reward (Liu, et al., 2011).
As many studies were included in this meta-analysis, it is not entirely sure which study parameters contributed the most to the final results. It is very likely that several types of reward and punishment were used, just as there may have been differences in how risky certain options were and how long the anticipation period lasted. In the following section several studies will be discussed to distinguish between different parameters and to provide an overview of what areas are involved in risk-taking. An overview of the decision-making process can be found in Figure 3.

Figure 3 – Different stages in the decision-making process and the brain areas that are involved in these stages. ACC = Anterior cingulate cortex,  mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex.

The nucleus accumbens is involved in in reward processing, as has been shown by an fMRI study looking at neural predictors of purchases. A total of 26 people participated in this study. They first saw a labelled object for four seconds, for example a box of chocolates. This was the product period. The next four seconds, the so-called price period, the object was shown with the price, and then participants had four seconds to decide whether or not to purchase the object for this price, the choice period (Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec and Loewenstein, 2007). An outline of this study can be found in Figure 4.
	This task studies several aspects of decision making. In the product period, the reward value of the choice option can be evaluated. During the price period a state of conflict may occur, when participants favour an item that turns out to be expensive. The actual decision to purchase or not to purchase is executed in the choice period. Purchasing leads to the reward of owning the purchased item. This task is a relevant study, because it resembles an everyday situation. When an individual is in a store, he first sees an item he might prefer. The next step is to look at the price, before deciding to purchase the item or not.


Figure 4 – Outline of the task. Reproduced from Knutson, et al., 2007, without permission. For task structure, subjects saw a labeled product (product period; 4 s), saw the product’s price (price period; 4 s), and then chose either to purchase the product or not (by selecting either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ presented randomly on the right or left side of the screen; choice period; 4 s), before fixating on a crosshair (2 s) prior to the onset of the next trial. In regression models, preference was correlated with brain activation during the product and price periods, price differential was correlated with brain activation during the price period, and purchasing was correlated with brain activation during the choice period.

It was found that activity in the nucleus accumbens during product and price period  was correlated with self-indicated preference post-scanning, i.e., the more a participant said to prefer an object, the higher the activity in the nucleus accumbens was. It was also found that activity in the mPFC correlated with the purchase of objects during the price period: Objects for which activity in the mPFC decreased during the price period where not purchased. When a participant decided to buy an object, activity in the mPFC increased during the choice period. The bilateral insula were found to be less active during the choice period when participants decided to purchase the object. In trials during which conflict was greatest, i.e., high preference and high price, activity in the ACC was higher, but levels of activity did not predict the decision (Knutson, et al., 2007). From this study it can be concluded that the nucleus accumbens plays a role in evaluating the options, i.e., it signals reward value. The mPFC signals the decision to purchase, as its activity during the choice period is higher for objects that were purchased, whereas the insula signals the decision not to purchase, i.e., not lose any money. The ACC activation implicates that this area is involved in conflict monitoring.
More evidence that the nucleus accumbens plays a role in reward processing, both in evaluating the options as the outcome, comes from another fMRI study. In this study eight young heterosexual males rated attractiveness of male and female faces, a socially relevant situation, as an individual might do so upon meeting someone for the first time. It was found that there was a significant difference between ratings of attractive and average faces for both male and female faces, but ratings of attractive males and attractive females did not differ. However, activity in the nucleus accumbens was higher when the males looked at the attractive female faces and the average male faces. Similar activity profiles were seen in the the central nucleus of the amygdala. Fifteen other males were asked to press on keys to either look for a longer or a shorter period of time at a face. This way a distinction can be made between what is rewarding and what are men prepared to work for. It was found that these males pressed to view attractive female faces for a longer period of time, while they pressed keys to look shorter at all male and the average female faces (Aharon, Etcoff, Ariely, Chabris, O’Connor and Breiter, 2001). These results show that not only the nucleus accumbens signals reward, but the same can be said for the central nucleus of the amygdala.
The role of the amygdala is traditionally based in processing negative emotions, for example fear. Both the central nucleus of and the basolateral amygdala have been found to be involved in fear processing (Murray, 2007). However, as seen in the experiment discussed above (Aharon, et al., 2001), the central nucleus of the amygdala has also been suggested to be involved in processing positive rewards. Some evidence for this latter function comes from an fMRI study in which twelve participants had to respond to a target to win money, avoid losing money or have no monetary outcome. After each trial, the participants were informed about the outcome (Hommer, Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, and Varner, 2003). This task is a simple responding task that does not contain a learning component, in which both reward and punishment occur. In the time between responding and showing of the outcome, there is anticipation of the outcome. 
The central nucleus of the amygdala was found to be active in anticipation of reward, i.e., winning of money, but not when the actual outcome was shown. The mPFC and ventral striatum were also active during anticipation of reward (Hommer, et al., 2003).
Another fMRI study supports the notion that the amygdala is involved in reward processing. In this study, fourteen participants were presented with a wheel of fortune task. In their version of the task, a wheel is divided in two halves that are each have their own colour. Participants were asked to select one of the two halves and then the wheel ‘spins’. If the outcome was the same colour as the one that the participants selected then they won the money associated with this half. For high-reward trials one half was associated with a win of $4.00, for low-reward trials participants had a 50% chance of winning $0.50. In both types of trial, there was a 50% chance that there was no win, in that case nothing happened. After selecting a colour, participants were asked how sure they felt about winning and after they had seen the outcome they were asked to indicate how they felt (Ernst, Nelson, Jazbec, McClure, Monk, Leibenluft, et al., 2005). In this task a distinction between reward and no reward is made, which is similar to for example a lottery. It is a simple gambling task, in which participants do not have an influence on the outcome.
Winning activated the amygdala and nucleus accumbens, whereas not winning $4.00 deactivated only the amygdala and not the nucleus accumbens. Not winning $0.50 did also not decrease amygdalar activity (Ernst, et al., 2005). This study not only found the amygdala is active in response to reward, but also that is deactivates in response to omission of a reward. It was also found that the nucleus accumbens only responds to reward, in this study winning.

Anticipation of reward has been briefly mentioned before. It is suggested that he vmPFC plays a role in this process. In an fMRI study with twelve participants the Lane Risk Taking Task was administered. During this task, participants have to choose between a safe and a risky option. The safe response assures a small amount of money, the risky response provides participants with the chance to win a larger amount of money, but this money can also be lost (Matthews, Simmons, Lane, and Paulus, 2004). This task is a simple example of studying risk-taking behaviour. It was found that there were no differences between safe and risky choices, i.e., participants did not make more safe or risky choices and response time for both responses was similar. Activation in the mPFC and nucleus accumbens was higher when deliberating was followed by a risky response (Matthews, et al., 2004). This activity may relate to the anticipation of reward or with evaluating the possible rewards and their associated risk.

One important aspect of decision making has not yet been discussed: Risk-taking. This was studied by letting 25 participants complete a wheel of fortune task (Smith, Mitchell, Hardin, Jazbec, Fridberg, Blair, et al., 2010). In this task, the wheels were divided differently than in the wheel of fortune task discussed before (Ernst, et al., 2005). The wheels in the current task were divided in two coloured parts, i.e., a pink and a blue one, that encompassed respectively 25% and 75% of the wheel, as can be seen in Figure 5a. In this study two types of wheels were used, one with the highest reward on the largest part of the wheel and the lowest reward on the smallest part of the wheel, the high magnitude condition, and one with the lowest reward on the largest part of the wheel and the highest reward on the smallest reward of the wheel, the low magnitude condition. Two sets of rewards were used in this study; $1.00 and $3.00, and $2.00 and $6.00, to introduce variability and the results were not analysed separately. In the low magnitude condition, the expected reward value is equal for both parts of the wheel, i.e., .25 x $3.00 is equal to .75 x $1.00, which creates a conflict situation. Participants had to select one colour and then the wheel was said to have spun. During feedback, participants saw the trial outcome and the total amount of money that they had won. This procedure is explained in Figure 5b (Smith, et al., 2010).

Figure 5 – Wheel of fortune task, reproduced from Smith, et al. (2010) without permission. A. The four task stimuli comprise two types of wheel. In one type, the wheels present the options of a high-probability/high-magnitude reward (high-prob./high-mag.) vs. a low-probability/ low-magnitude reward (low-prob./low mag.). In the other type, the two options are a high-probability/low-magnitude (high-prob./low mag.) reward vs. a low-probability/high-magnitude reward (low-prob./high mag.). B. Example of a single task trial. Analyses focused on brain activation during the 4 s of the selection period.

As expected, it was found that the 75% chance of winning the high reward was chosen more often than the 75% chance of winning the low reward. Choosing the 75% chance of a high reward increased activity the mPFC, bilateral insula and amygdala more than choosing the 25% chance at a low reward. Having a 25% chance of winning the high reward activated the middle frontal gyrus and ACC more than the 75% chance of winning the high reward. The ACC was also found to be more activated when a participant choose the 25% chance of a high reward compared to 75% chance of the low reward (Smith, et al., 2010). These results indicate that the ACC is involved in risk-taking behaviour and conflict-monitoring. The activation in the mPFC is more evidence this brain area plays a role in anticipation of reward. The insula might also play a role in anticipation of reward, this will be discussed later.

More evidence for the role of the ACC in decision-making comes from a study in which fourteen participants had to choose between playing one of two presented gambles; a control gamble and an experimental gamble. For each gamble the possible gain, possible loss and the probability of winning were shown (Rogers, Ramnani, Mackay, Wilson, Jezzard, Carter, et al., 2004). See Figure 6 for an example display. 


Figure 6 – Example display, reproduced from Rogers, et al. (2004) without permission. Example display consisting of a control gamble showing a 50% chance of winning 10 points and a 50% chance of losing 10 points, and an experimental gamble showing a .33 chance of winning 80 points and a .66 chance of losing 20 points.

The control gamble, shown on the left side in yellow in Figure 6, had a 50% probability of winning and a 50% probability of losing ten points. The experimental gamble, as shown in blue on the right side of Figure 6, was either a 66% or 33% chance of winning a large reward, eighty points, or a small reward of twenty points.  Losses could also either be eighty or twenty points, i.e., high or low. See Table 1 for an overview of all possible experimental gambles. After each gamble, participants received visual feedback indicating if they won or lost (Rogers, et al., 2004).

Table 1 – Possible experimental gambles, reproduced from Rogers, et al. (2004) without permission. Eight types of experimental gamble resulting from the combinations, in a factorial design, of two levels of probability, possible gains, and possible losses.

Probability	Possible Gains	Possible Losses









In this task, there are eight different trial types associated with different reward sizes, punishment sizes and levels of risk. Participants therefore need to pay attention to every trial, to determine the specific parameters of that trial. In real life, every decision is different, a situation resembled in this task by the different trial types.
It was found that participants chose the high probability experimental gamble, i.e., 66% chance to win, more often than the low probability experimental gamble, i.e., 33% chance to win. When the possible loss was high, i.e., eighty points, participants choice the control gamble, i.e., 50% chance to win or lose ten points, more often than when the possible loss was low. The experimental gamble was chosen more often for a high possible gain than for a small possible gain. From the fMRI data it was found that deciding between a possible high gain and the control gamble versus deciding between a possible low gain and the control gamble was associated with higher activity in the ACC and the OFC. This indicates that the ACC and OFC are involved in monitoring the possible reward size. Winning the gamble increased activity in the vmPFC, the posterior OFC and ventral striatum (Rogers, et al., 2004), regions of the brain that have been found to be involved in winning a reward (see e.g. Bechera, et al., 1999).

Nineteen people participated in another study that found involvement of the ACC. The outline of the trials can be seen in Figure 7. For every trial they were to draw two cards from a deck of ten. Before they saw the cards, they placed a $1 bet on whether the second card they would draw would be higher or lower than the first card. Each trial a new set of ten cards was used, so all trials were independent from each other and the chance of winning was fifty percent for all the trials. After participants had seen both cards, they had to indicate whether they won or lost the trial, before moving on to the next trial. Each participant was presented with three sets of 30 trials (Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and Quartz, 2006). This experiment is similar to the simple gamble experiments as discussed above (see Ernst, et al., 2005; Matthews et al., 2004). In this experiment participants place a gamble without having any knowledge about the cards that are used or having any influence on the outcome.

Figure 7 – Trial outline, reproduced from Preuschoff, et al. (2006) without permission. On each trial, two cards were drawn (without replacement within each trial) from a deck of ten, numbered 1 through 10. Before seeing either card, subjects first placed a $1 bet on one of two options, ‘‘second card higher’’ or ‘‘second card lower’’ (than first card shown). Subjects could earn $1 if they guessed the right card and lost $1 if they were wrong. Once the bet was placed, subjects saw card 1, followed 7 s later by card 2. At the end of each trial, subjects had to indicate whether they won or lost on this trial. A $0.25 penalty was imposed for misreporting, independent of the outcome of the gamble. All times shown are with respect to the onset of the trial.

It was found that participants won about half of their trials, which was expected as they could not do anything to influence their chances of winning. After the bet was placed, the first card was shown, seven seconds later the second card was shown and seven seconds after that they had to indicate whether or not they won the trial. Misreporting occurred only in a few percent of the trials and was punished by a $0.25 penalty. This punishment forced participants to pay attention to the outcome of the trial. The caudate nucleus, putamen, thalamus and cingulate cortex were found to be activated by winning. Anticipation of reward after the first card was shown correlated with activity in the ventral striatum, putamen and ACC, but only activity in the ventral striatum and putamen was found to correlate with reward probability. In other words; the higher the chance of reward was after seeing the first card, the higher the activity in the ventral striatum and putamen (Preuschoff, et al., 2006). These results indicate that the ventral striatum and putamen are related with reward anticipation. The ACC may be related to anticipation or reward and uncertainty. Risk was correlated with activation in the anterior insula (AI), OFC and areas posterior of the ventral striatum (Preuschoff, et al., 2006). However, both the caudate nucleus and putamen have previously been found to play a role in habit formation (Yin and Knowlton, 2006), which suggests that participants automated their responses in this experiment. In the experiment, participants place a bet before they have any information about the cards and all trials are independent from each other (Preuschoff, et al., 2006). It is therefore impossible to determine some sort of strategy to win as many trials as possible. Even though participants were forced to pay attention to the task, it is likely they formed an automated strategy that the followed throughout the experiment. The activity in the caudate nucleus and putamen may be related to the formation of the strategy. Because participants were forced to pay attention to the bet they placed and the cards that were drawn, the other findings are still reliable.

The Cambridge Gamble Task is often used in decision-making research. It has been used to study the role of the insula. In this task, ten boxes are displayed, some of which are red en some are blue, as can be seen in Figure 8. Ratio of red:blue boxes varied from 9:1 tot 1:9, i.e., from nine red and one blue box to one red box and nine blue ones. Participants were told that the computer will randomly select one box and that they have to indicate if the computer selected a red or a blue box by placing a bet. They did so by selecting a coloured box on the bottom of the screen. Possible amounts to bet were shown in sequence in the square on the right side of the screen. An amount was chosen by touching the box (Clark, Bechara, Damasio, Aitken, Sahakian, and Robbins, 2008).

Figure 8 – Example display of the Cambridge Gamble Task, reproduced from Clark, et al. (2008) without permission. Schematic showing the screen display for the Cambridge Gamble Task.

In a lesion-study, thirteen patients with damage to the insular cortex, twenty with damage to the vmPFC, twelve lesion controls and 41 healthy controls performed the Cambridge Gamble Task. The results from this study are displayed in Figure 9. It was found that performance by the lesion controls did not differ from the healthy controls (Clark, et al, 2008). From this it can be concluded that having a lesion per se does not influence performance in the Cambridge Gamble Task. Patients with damage to the vmPFC were found to place higher bets than the healthy controls, but they adjusted their bets in a similar way (Clark, et al., 2008). This indicates that these patients take more risk than healthy controls but that they are still able to recognize a change in chance of winning. This is further evidence the vmPFC plays a role in evaluation of possible reward size.
Both the control group and the vmPFC patients placed higher bets when more boxes had the same colour. I.e., when there were nine red boxes bets were higher than in trials with six red boxes. Patients with damage to the insular cortex placed similar bets as the healthy controls in low-risk trials, i.e., nine boxes of the same colour, but placed higher bets on high-risk trials. In other words: They did not adjust their bets in a similar way. From these results it can be concluded that the insula plays a role in anticipation of risk and in risk-taking (Clark, et al., 2008). When the insula is damaged, a person is no longer able to detect changes in the chance of winning and therefore the bet is not adjusted.


Figure 9 – Results of the Cambridge Gamble Task, reproduced from Clark, et al. (2008) without permission. The effect of ratio on betting behaviour in the four groups of participants: healthy controls, vmPFC lesions, insular cortex lesions and the lesion control group.

The finding that patients with damage to the insula do not adjust their bets when the chance of winning changes is consistent with the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH). According to the SMH the insula plays a role in the evolvement of somatic markers (see e.g. Bechara, 2004 or Bechara and Damasio, 2005). When these somatic markers do not arise, changes in risk are not signalled and do therefore not influence the bet. The vmPFC is necessary to induce somatic markers in response to secondary inducers, for example thinking about a previous experience. Damage to the vmPFC disrupts this process, which is why somatic markers do not arise in these patients and they take more risk. They can still gain knowledge about the situation, for example the Cambridge Gamble Task or the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, et al., 1997). This explains why vmPFC patients place higher bets than healthy controls, but do adjust their bets when the chance to win changes.

The AI also plays a role in anticipation of reward and motivation. In another study sixty participants successfully completed an fMRI-experiment in which they were first informed about the potential reward for that trial. There were four possible rewards: $1, $5, small candy and large candy, and no reward as a control condition. Then a target appeared on the screen and participants had to respond before the target disappeared. When they were fast enough they received the reward. The experimental program was adapted during the experiment so that participants were successful in about sixty percent of all trials (Clithero, Reeck, Carter, Smith, and Huettel, 2011). In this task different reward types are used to distinguish between how motivated participants are to get the reward. This comes a bit closer to real life than studies that use only one type of reward, as in real life there are usually different reward types associated with the different options. For example choosing between going to work by car or by bike: Going by car is fast and easy, but going by bike safes an individual the trouble of having to find a parking space and it is healthy to get some exercise.
It was found that on the big money, i.e., $5, reaction time was fastest, indicating that participants motivation to win that reward was larger than for the other rewards. Only for the small candy trials reaction time was not faster than for the control trials, indicating that participants were not motivated to win the small candy. Anticipation of rewards, especially the big rewards, activated the nucleus accumbens and the AI. These results indicate that the more active the nucleus accumbens and AI were, the more motivated participants were to win the reward. Further it was found that activity in the nucleus accumbens mediated the influence of the AI on motivation, i.e., the higher activity in the nucleus accumbens, the higher activity in the AI and the more motivated the participants were. These results provide more evidence that the nucleus accumbens signals reward value, as discussed before. With regards to the role of the AI it may be suggested that the AI plays a role in processing reward value and motivation. As participants did not know the outcome of the trial during the anticipatory phase, activity in the AI may also signal this uncertainty (Clithero, et al., 2011).





Table 2 – Comparison of brain areas involved in reward processing and anticipation of reward according to the discussed studies and the meta-analysis by Liu, et al., 2011.

Brain area	Discussed studies	Liu, et al., 2011
Nucleus accumbens	Reward processing and anticipation of reward.	Reward processing, less active during anticipation of reward.
Ventral striatum	Anticipation of reward and reward outcome.	Reward processing and anticipation of reward.
Amygdala	Anticipation of reward and reward outcome.	Reward processing.
ACC	Anticipation of reward.	Reward processing, more activity for punishment, and anticipation of reward.
AI	Anticipation of reward.	Reward processing and anticipation of reward.
mPFC	Reward processing and anticipation of reward.	Reward processing and anticipation of reward.
OFC	Reward outcome.	Reward processing, less activity for reward anticipation.
Note: ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, AI = anterior insula, mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex, OFC = orbitofrontal cortex.


Influences on reward value

Future discounting is the principle in which the same reward has less value if a person has to wait to get it. This can be influenced by different aspects of the reward. The type and size of the reward have been shown to influence future discounting. A total of 102 people participated in a study in which food and money were used as rewards. In the large reward condition the maximum reward was $100 or $100 worth of food, in the small reward condition this was $10 or $10 worth of food. Participants were asked to choose between an immediate reward and one later, varying between one day and two years. Figure 10 shows the levels of future discounting. For money no difference in rate of discounting was found between the large and small reward condition. For food there was a difference: In the large reward condition, the value of food later is discounted more when the wait for the reward is only a few days and it flattens after that. In the small reward condition the discounting is more similar to the money conditions, although initial discounting is steeper. In both the large and small reward conditions, the value of food is discounted at a steeper rate. (Odum, Baumann and Rimington, 2006). In other words; the value of food decreases faster over time than the value of money. These results suggest that different types of rewards have different reward values, even though the monetary value is the same, this may influence other studies. It is especially important to be cautious in comparing responses to different types of reward.


Figure 10 – Results of the future discounting task, reproduced from Odum et al., (2006) without permission. Temporal discounting functions for large amounts of money and food (left panel) and small amounts of money and food (right panel). Points show median indifference points for the outcomes as a function of delay, expressed as percentage of the delayed amount. Lines show the best-fitting discount functions generated
by the hyperboloid model (see text for details).

In a recent study it was found that blood glucose levels also influence future discounting. A total of 65 people participated in this study, in which they were instructed not to eat before the experiment. During the experiment, 32 participants in the experimental condition got a soft drink containing sugar, the other 33 participants were in the control condition. They received a soft drink containing an artificial sweetener. First, blood glucose levels were measured and the initial future-discounting task was administered. In this task participants had to choose between a small monetary reward tomorrow or a larger monetary reward in 4 to 939 days. Then they drank their soft drink and after ten minutes blood glucose was again measured. After this, the future-discounting task was administered again. It was found that in the first task, future-discounting rate did not differ among the two groups. In the second task, so after the soft drink was consumed, participants in the experimental condition decreased future discounting, i.e., participants who had been given a soft drink containing sugar, chose the future reward more often. In the control condition, future discounting increased and blood glucose levels decreased. From these results it can be concluded that low blood glucose decreases the value of future rewards (Whang and Dvorak, 2010). This can be explained by a feeling of urgency: Low blood glucose is a sign that a person should soon consume something to increase blood glucose. To be able to do this, a future reward is not relevant, but an immediate reward is. This explains increased future discounting in the group that drank a soft drink with an artificial sweetener.

Risk-taking behaviour is influenced by previous experiences. Fifty people participated in a study to show this, ten of which first showed they could discriminate between the different amounts of sips of Gatorade, which was used as a reward in this study. The other forty participants performed the gambling task in which they either gambled for Gatorade or for money, which was indicated by the colour of two squares on a computer screen. Participants could either choose a safe option or a risky option. The safe option was a guaranteed reward, in the risky option there was an even gamble between two rewards; one smaller and one larger than the safe option. A total of two hundred trials was performed, one hundred with money and one hundred with Gatorade. There are different ways of playing this task. Participants that are risk-aversive will choose the safe option more often than they will choose the risky option, while risk seeking participants will behave the other way around, i.e., they will go more often for the risky option than for the safe option. Across subjects, there was only a significant bias towards risk aversion on the money trials.  There was no difference in risk preference when Gatorade was the reward, i.e., across subjects there was no tendency to either be risk-aversive or risk-seeking. Participants were more likely to choose the risky option again after a successful gamble, which shows that people have a tendency to use a win stay-lose shift strategy. In other words: From this study it can be concluded that when a person wins a gamble, that person is more likely to gamble again, but when that person loses he or she is more likely to go for the safe option next time (Hayden and Platt, 2009).

Other people can also influence our opinion and therefore decision-making. Twenty-four females participated in an fMRI study in which they were first presented with the picture of a celebrity, followed by a picture of an object. These celebrity-object pairs could be high-expertise, i.e., the object obviously matched the celebrity, or low-expertise, when the celebrity and object did not obviously match. An example of a high-expertise combination is the famous tennis player Andre Agassi followed by a sport shoe. In a low-expertise pair Andre Agassi could be followed by an alcoholic drink. Participants were asked to indicate if they perceived a link between the celebrity and the object for a total of 180 pairs. The next day participants were given a recognition test in which they saw the 180 objects presented on day 1 and 180 new objects. They were also asked how likely they were to buy the item. An overview of these procedures are shown in Figure 11 (Klucharev, Smidts and Fernández, 2008).
 

Figure 11 – Trial outline, reproduced from Klucharev, et al. (2008) without permission. Trial structure. During each trial of the encoding session (day 1), subjects were presented with the photo of a celebrity followed by the photo of an object (product). All stimuli were separated by varying ISI. Subjects were instructed to indicate whether or not they see a link between the celebrity and the object. The gradient bar represents the time when BOLD signal was modeled for each trials. On day 2, recognition memory and attitude towards the object presented in two separate sessions were tested. Finally, familiarity, physical attractiveness and perceived expertise of celebrities were measured (this step is not depicted here). A sketch of a celebrity and not a real photo as used in the study is presented in the figure due to potential copyright restrictions.

It was found that memory was better for items in the high-expertise condition and that participants were more likely to favour the items that were presented in this condition (Klucharev, et al., 2008). This suggests that it might be rewarding to follow someone else’s opinion. Analyses of the fMRI data showed a higher activity for not favoured items in the caudate nucleus, ACC, insula, amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus (Klucharev, et al., 2008). Activity in the ACC might point to a conflict situation: It might be rewarding to favour an item in the high-expertise condition.




Suggestions for future research

Future research should focus on the role of the insula in decision-making. The insula is involved in sensing the state of the body, including the state of the internal organs like the heart, lungs and gut. The anterior part of the insula (AI) receives thalamic input about visceral states, i.e., being hungry or a breath-taking sensation (Iversen, Iverson, and Saper, 2000). Not only feelings from the body, but also emotional feelings have been shown to activate the AI (Craig, 2009). This can be feelings in the immediate moment, but the insula can also predict future feelings and this is important in decision-making (Craig, 2009), as also acknowledged In the SMH (Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1996). I hypothesize that the insula plays a role in the influence the level of blood glucose has on reward processing in a future-discounting task (Whang and Dvorak, 2010. One possible mechanism might be sensing a low blood glucose level and signalling the need to take in some sugar. As the insula is regularly found to be involved in different tasks (see e.g. Craig, 2002; 2009), other research areas might benefit from this research as well.
Other aspects of the current body state might also influence future discounting, e.g. thirst might have the same effect as a low blood-glucose level. Other influences might be an overall feeling of health and age. Future research could investigate this to get a better understanding of the mechanisms of future discounting and what people under different circumstances find rewarding.
Another topic future research should focus on is the role of the ACC and its connections with brain areas fulfilling similar roles, for example the mPFC. The ACC has been suggested to be involved in processing reward value, monitoring conflict and reward anticipation. It might be that the latter two processes might be happening at the same time, for example when the chance of a reward is about fifty percent. Connections between the ACC and OFC have also been suggested to play a role in decision making, but the nature of this role is still unknown (see e.g. Liu, et al., 2011; Rushworth, et al., 2011). 






The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is an influential theory of human decision making. It emphasizes the role of the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Another important brain area according to this theory is the insula. The amygdala is responsible for a reaction to the first encounter of a stimulus. Emotional memory for these stimuli is built in the vmPFC, which is also responsible for reacting when a stimulus is encountered for a second time. The vmPFC activates the amygdala, which in turn recreates the feeling from the first time. This happens either by actually reliving the moment in the body, which in turn activates somatosensory cortices like the insula, the so-called body-loop. In the second route, the as if-loop, the body is bypassed and the amygdala directly activates the somatosensory cortices via the brainstem (Bechara, 2004; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1996).
Much of the evidence for the SMH comes from the Iowa gambling task (IGT). It was found that people with damage to the amygdala or vmPFC perform disadvantageously on this task (see e.g. Bechera, et al., 1994; 1997). Patients with damage to the vmPFC were shown to still behave disadvantageously when they knew what was going on in the task. This can be explained by a lack of emotional response, as shown by the lack of skin conductance responses (Bechera, et al., 2997).

Other studies showed that not only the central nucleus of the amygdala (see e.g. Hommer, et al., 2003) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; see e.g. Rogers, et al., 2004) are involved in reward processing. The nucleus accumbens (see e.g. Aharon, et al., 2001; Knutson, et al., 2007) and ventral striatum (see e.g. Rogers, et al., 2004) also play a role in this process. The nucleus accumbens and mPFC not only process reward outcome, but are also involved in the evaluation of the reward value of the different choice options (see e.g. Knutson, et al., 2007). When it comes to risk-taking, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), which is suggested to play a role in conflict monitoring (see e.g. Rogers, et al., 2004), the mPFC (see e.g. Rogers, et al., 2004) and the insula (see e.g. Preusschof, et al., 2006) are involved. The latter two structures might work via the mechanism suggested by the SMH.
After a decision has been made and an individual anticipates reward, the nucleus accumbens (see e.g. Matthews, 2004), ventral striatum (see e.g., Hommer, et al., 2003), amygdala (see e.g. Hommer, et al., 2003), mPFC (see e.g. Matthews, et al., 2004) and insula (see e.g. Liu, et al., 2011) all play a role.

Reward-processing can be influenced by delaying the time an individual has to wait before he or she actually receives the reward. The longer the delay, the lower the value a reward; a phenomenon called future-discounting. How much reward value actually decreases depends not only on the delay, but also on what the reward is. It was found that discounting of food is steeper than discounting of money (Odum, et al., 2006). Another influence comes from the current state of the body. Low levels in blood glucose were shown to increase the discounting rate. Or to put it in other words, the value of a reward at a later time was lower when blood-glucose was low (Whang and Dvorak, 2010).
	Other people have also been found to influence what we find rewarding. In a study in which celebrities were related to different objects they were either suggested to have expert-knowledge for (the high-expertise condition, e.g. tennis player Andre Agassi and a sport shoe) or no relation with (the low-expertise condition, e.g. Andre Agassi and an alcoholic drink). It was found that participants favoured the objects that were in the high-expertise condition and memory for these objects was better (Klucharev, et al., 2008). A possible explanation for this effect comes from the finding that it is rewarding to have the same opinion as an expert (Cambell-Meiklejohn, 2010).
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